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ACHIEVING JUSTICE BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL:
CHALLENGES FOR THE DEFENSE COUNSEL
MARK S. ELLIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Tribunal has not been established to satisfy the victims only,
but to bring justice to all, including the accused.1
At 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, May 7, 1996, the first trial under juris-
diction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia (ICTY) began.  It was the beginning of a remarkable experi-
ment in international humanitarian law, a nascent body of law rooted
in international custom and binding on all states.  Not since the Nur-
emberg and Tokyo trials has the international community unambigu-
ously declared that individuals who violate fundamental human rights
will be held accountable and brought to justice.
Of course, much has changed since the trials at Nuremberg and
Tokyo.  Unlike its predecessors, the ICTY is a non-military court.
Moreover, it was established in the midst of violent conflict, making
it difficult to collect evidence and to execute warrants.  In the after-
math of World War II, most defendants at Nuremberg and Tokyo
were in custody;2 the majority of suspects indicted by the ICTY are
*
 Mark S. Ellis is Executive Director of the American Bar Association’s Central and East
European Law Initiative (CEELI).  Based in Washington, D.C., CEELI provides technical le-
gal assistance to countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  Mr.
Ellis also acts as Special Counsel to the Coalition for International Justice (CIJ), which pro-
vides assistance to the International War Crimes Tribunal.  The author would like to thank
Margaret Zokowski and Laurie MacDonald Brumberg for their editorial assistance and com-
ments.
1. Michail Wladimiroff, Opening Remarks, Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T at 35
(May 7, 1996) [hereinafter Opening Remarks] (transcript on file with the Duke Journal of
Comparative & International Law).
2. See Bulletin of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, No. 5/6,
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still at large.3
These difficulties notwithstanding, the ICTY will not and should
not be judged on the basis of indictments or convictions.  Though it is
true that the ICTY was created to hold war criminals accountable for
their actions,4 expedited convictions will never be a substitute for jus-
tice.  Ultimately, the ICTY will be judged by the fairness of its pro-
ceedings and by the certainty that the accused are given a fair trial
and proper defense.  During the Nuremberg trials, Justice Robert
Jackson conveyed this sentiment when he said, “[i]f you are deter-
mined to execute a man in any case, there is no occasion for a trial.
The world yields no respect to courts that are merely organized to
convict.”5
The first trial before the ICTY was that of Dusko Tadic, a café
owner and part-time karate instructor formerly residing in the Prije-
dor region of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  He was charged with individual
criminal responsibility for Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949, Violations of the Laws or Customs of War, and Crimes
Against Humanity, according to Articles 2, 3, and 5, respectively, of
the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Violations of
International Humanitarian Law in the former Yugoslavia (Statute).6
At the time he was apprehended and extradited to the Hague,
Tadic resided and was working in Germany.7  Tadic was the first in-
dicted suspect to be taken into custody by the ICTY.8  Standing trial
before a court of historic and international significance, and facing
charges of enormous gravity, Dusko Tadic needed to secure legal
representation.  According to the Tribunal’s Statute9 and the Direc-
                                                                                                                                     
May 24, 1996 at 4; AIREY NEAVE, ON TRIAL AT NUREMBURG 58 n.3 (1979); JOHN PRITCHARD
& SONIA ZAIDE, THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 3-4 (1981).
3. Out of 74 indictees, only eight were in custody as of December 18, 1996.  See BULL. OF
THE INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, No. 13, Dec. 18, 1996.
4. “The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since 1991 . . . .”  Statute of the International Tribunal, Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
Annex, art. 6, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter Statute].
5. ROBERT E. CONOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG 14 (1983).
6. See Indictment of Dusko Tadic, Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T at 5 (February 13,
1995) [hereinafter Indictment].
7. See Int’l Crim. Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Tadic Fact Sheet, (press release)
(on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law).
8. See Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/50/365/S/728 (1995).
9. The Statute reads that the accused shall be entitled “to be tried in his presence, and to
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tive on Assignment of Defense Counsel (Directive),10 a defendant
who is found to be indigent has the right to court-appointed counsel,
free of charge.11  The criteria for determining indigence have been es-
tablished by the head of the Registry12 and approved by the judges.13
If the accused meets the established criteria, the Registrar assigns
counsel.14
For an indigent defendant, the assignment of counsel will be the
most important decision—other than the Trial Chamber’s ultimate
decision of guilt or innocence—made in the course of his or her trial.
Under provisions of the Directive,15 Tadic requested counsel and
provided evidence to show that he was indigent.  On May 1, 1995, the
Registrar determined Tadic to be indigent and consequently assigned
him counsel.16
Much can be learned from the Tadic trial, which is the ICTY’s
first experience in assigning counsel.  It is important to review certain
basic elements of the assigned counsel provision of the Statute17 and
to identify areas which need improvement.  Such an effort can un-
doubtedly improve the trial process.  Significantly, it can also en-
                                                                                                                                     
defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he
does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any
case . . . if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it . . . .” Statute, supra note 4, art. 21(d).
10. See Directive on Assignment of Defence Counsel, The International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. Doc. IT/73/Rev.1 (1994),
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1576 (1994) [hereinafter Directive].
11. An indigent is defined as a person who “does not have sufficient means to engage
counsel of his choice and to have himself legally represented or assisted by counsel of his
choice.” Id. art. 5  (emphasis added).
12. The Registry is responsible for the administration of the Tribunal. The Registry is
headed by the Registrar, Mrs. Dorothee de Sampayo. The Registry manages Court proceed-
ings, publishes documents, handles all budgetary and personnel matters, oversees the victims
and witnesses unit, and assigns defense counsel.
13. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, at Rule 45(B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 7
(1996), available in Univ. of Minn. Human Rights Library (visited Mar. 29, 1997)
<http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/icty/ct-rules7.html> (on file with the Duke Journal of Com-
parative & International Law) [hereinafter Rules].
14. A person requesting the assignment of counsel must make a declaration of his means,
which in turn must be certified. See Directive, supra note 10, arts. 8-9; Rules, supra note 13,
Rule 45(C ).
15. See Directive, supra note 10, at arts. 5-11.
16. On April 27, 1995, Mr. Tadic provided the ICTY with a Declaration of Means, which
resulted in the Registry’s decision that Mr. Tadic was indigent. See Decision by the Registry
(May 1, 1995) (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law).
17. See Statute, supra note 4, art. 21(d).
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hance the Tribunal’s credibility, which rests in part upon the quality
of defense afforded each defendant.
II.  SELECTION OF COUNSEL
The ICTY’s method of identifying qualified attorneys and as-
signing counsel is straightforward.  An attorney must meet several
requirements to the satisfaction of the Registrar, including having
been admitted to a state bar or being a professor of law, and having
fluency in one of the working languages of the Court (French or
English).18  An attorney wishing to be considered for defense counsel
simply notifies the Registrar.19  When an attorney is deemed quali-
fied, the Registrar adds his or her name to a list of qualified candi-
dates.20  It is from this list that the Registrar selects and assigns coun-
sel for indigent defendants.  When counsel is selected, the Registrar
notifies the attorney as well as the professional or governing body
18. See Directive, supra note 10, art. 14; Rules, supra note 13, Rule 44.  A recent amend-
ment to the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence allows for the appointment of counsel
who does not speak French or English.  Rule 45(A)(ii) now reads: “In particular circumstances,
upon the request of an indigent suspect or accused, the Registrar may be authorized, by a
Judge or a Trial Chamber, seized of  the case, to assign counsel who speaks the language of the
suspect or the accused but does not speak either of the two working languages of the Tribunal.”
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Amendments Adopted during the Eleventh Plenary Meeting,
Rule 45. (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law) [hereinafter
Amended Rules].  This change is also reflected in the Amended Directive, which reads: “In par-
ticular circumstances, a Judge or the Trial Chamber seized of the case may, upon the request of
the suspect or the accused, authorize the Registrar to assign counsel who speaks the language
of the suspect or the accused but does not speak either of the two working languages of the
Tribunal.”  Directive on Assignment of Defense Counsel, as Amended 25 June 1996, art. 14(B),
U.N. Doc. IT/73/Rev.2 [hereinafter Amended Directive].
19. Mr. Michail Wladimiroff notified the Tribunal on October 17, 1994 of his interest in
acting as counsel to indigent suspects.  On October 19, 1994, the Acting Registrar for the
ICTY, Theo van Boven, responded to Mr. Wladimiroff in a letter, stating the following: “Rule
45(a) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence requires for the Registrar to keep a list of coun-
sel, who speak one or both of the working languages of the Tribunal, meet the requirements of
Rule 44 and have indicated their willingness to be assigned by the Tribunal to indigent suspects
or accused.  In light of the information provided in your letter and your curriculum vitae your
name will be placed on the list.”  Letter from Theo van Boven, Acting Registrar for the ICTY,
to Mr. Wladimiroff, Attorney at Law (Oct. 19, 1994) (on file with the Duke Journal of Com-
parative & International Law).
20. See Rules, supra note 13, Rule 45(A).  The list includes 66 practicing lawyers and pro-
fessors from 13 countries, including Australia, Canada, Croatia, The Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (Serbia and Montenegro), France, Italy, The Netherlands, Switzerland, The United
Kingdom and the United States.  See Report, supra note 8, at 25; Report of the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Hu-
manitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. SCOR,
51st Sess. at 29, U.N. Doc. A/51/292/S/665 (1996) [hereinafter Amended Report].
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with which he or she is associated. 21
The central problem with the current selection process is that it
overlooks the need for extraordinary legal qualifications.  Since the
ICTY is an international judicial body that uniquely prosecutes viola-
tions of international humanitarian law, it is imperative that the de-
fense have expertise and experience in this area.  The repertoire of
skills used in a “domestic” criminal case, while extremely relevant,
does not necessarily include the legal background required in an in-
ternational war crimes case.  The average attorney simply is not
schooled in this practice.  In effect, the attorney who undertakes to
defend an alleged war criminal must be multi-talented.  The ICTY
must ensure that assigned counsel has practiced actively in the area
of criminal law, and possesses substantial experience in international
humanitarian law.22  The current requirements fall short in this re-
gard.
In addition to criminal and international humanitarian law, as-
signed counsel must be conversant with both common law and civil
law systems.  The reason for this is two-fold.  First, the ICTY’s trial
judges come from common law and from civil law states.23  Because
their decisions will be informed by their own legal backgrounds,
counsel must be prepared to argue and respond to issues relevant to
both systems and to anticipate matters of unique concern before the
21. See Directive, supra note 10, art. 12(B).  On April 25, 1995, Mrs. Dorothee de Sam-
payo Garrido-Nijgh, Registrar for the ICTY, notified Michail Wladimiroff, in writing, that he
had been assigned Defense Counsel for Mr. Dusko Tadic in all proceedings before the Tribu-
nal.  The letter was copied to Mr. Tom de Waard, President of the Nederlandse Orde Van Ad-
vokaten.  Letter from Ms. Dorothee de Sampayo Garrido-Nijgh, Registrar for the ICTY, to Mr.
Wladimiroff (April 25, 1995) (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International
Law).  Mr. Wladimiroff was also informed of the final decision to appoint him Defense Counsel
to Mr. Tadic after Mr. Tadic was determined indigent by the Registrar.  Letter from Ms.
Dorothee de Sampayo Garrido-Nijgh, Registrar for the ICTY, to Mr. Wladimiroff (May 1,
1995) (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law).
22. For instance, in the United States, guidelines have been established setting forth quali-
fications for assigned counsel in the federal public defender program.  In recruiting and select-
ing candidates for the Office of Federal Public Defender in the Eleventh Circuit, for example,
applicants must not only be a member in good standing of a state bar, but must also, among
other things, have been engaged in the “active practice” of criminal law for at least five years,
and show “outstanding legal ability and competence” as evidenced by “substantial legal expe-
rience, ability to deal with complex legal problems, aptitude for legal scholarship and writing,
and familiarity with courts and court processes.”  Regulations of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for the Selection and Appointment or the Reappointment of
Federal Public Defenders, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Rules, Add.
VII, § 5, codified at 28 U.S.C.A. Rules (West 1997).
23. For instance, in the Tadic trial, the three Trial Chamber judges are: Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald (United States), Datuk Lal Vohrah (Malaysia), and Sir Ninian Stephen (Australia).
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Tribunal.  This may include matters of specific concern to an interna-
tional court.  For example, the Tribunal’s Rules allow trial court
judges to legislate on procedural matters, such as adopting and
amending the Rules at plenary meetings.24
A recent decision rendered by the Trial Chamber in the Tadic
case illustrates the value of counsel’s familiarity with both civil and
common law systems.  The prosecutor wanted access to the written
statements of defense witnesses.  In the United States, these state-
ments fall under the “reciprocal discovery rule” and are frequently
used for impeachment purposes.25  The defense attorneys vehemently
objected to this request, arguing that such statements are privileged,
in the same way that attorney-client communications are privileged.
The Trial Chamber ruled 2-1 in favor of protecting the written state-
ments of defense witnesses.26  The civil law judges (Vohrah and Ste-
phen) voted in favor of the defense while Judge McDonald from the
United States voted in favor of the prosecution.
The second reason for defense counsel to be schooled in both
systems stems from the procedural requirements for presenting a
case before the ICTY.  Since the Tribunal’s Rules of Evidence and
Procedure (Rules) are based largely on an adversarial model and do
not follow the inquisitorial approach used in civil law systems, as-
signed counsel must be adept at arguing cases in an adversarial pro-
ceeding.27  The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials also relied upon this
common-law trial practice; judges did not actively participate in the
trial proceedings, and made it clear that all responsibility for cross-
examining witnesses rested with the defense attorneys.28  Despite the
ICTY’s reliance on the adversarial model, however, the current Rules
do not specifically require counsel to have common-law trial experi-
ence.
The case against Dusko Tadic highlights several problems that
can arise when attorneys lack the relevant experience in trial advo-
cacy.  Professor Michail Wladimiroff, one of the Netherlands’ top
criminal lawyers, was assigned as lead counsel for Mr. Tadic.  Mr.
24. See Rules, supra note 13, Rule 6.  This is different from national systems, where proce-
dural codes are adopted by the legislature.
25. See 23 AM. JUR. 2D, Reciprocal Discovery § 463.
26. This decision was made in closed session.  As this Comment was composed a written
notice had not yet been issued.  Telephone Interview with Alain Norman, CIJ liaison to the
Tribunal (Oct. 25, 1996) [hereinafter Norman Interview].
27. In a civil law system, the judge is an independent, active investigator.  The prosecutor
and defense attorney play a relatively passive role during the trial.
28. See CONOT, supra note 5, 86-87.
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Wladimiroff has impeccable credentials.29  Mr. Wladimiroff asked
Alphons Orie, another highly-qualified attorney from his firm, to
work part-time on the case.30  Despite the considerable competence
of both attorneys, the Dutch civil law system, under which Wladimi-
roff and Orie practice, has not provided them with an opportunity to
develop skills they will need to aggressively participate in an adver-
sarial trial.  Under the Dutch system, the judge plays the primary role
in examining witnesses.  The judge is an independent, active investi-
gator, while the prosecution and defense remain relatively passive
during the trial.31
Recognizing their own lack of experience in an adversarial trial,
Mr. Wladimiroff and Mr. Orie approached the American Bar Asso-
ciation’s Central and East European Law Initiative (CEELI)32 for as-
sistance in sharpening their trial techniques—particularly examining
and cross-examining witnesses.33  CEELI responded with a week-long
training exercise for the defense team.  Two U.S. criminal trial law-
yers and one English barrister participated in the training program.34
29. Professor Wladimiroff is a Member of the Bar the Supreme Court of the Netherlands.
Since 1989, he has been Chairman of the Permanent Advisory Body on Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure of the Dutch National Bar Association.  Since 1992, he has been Vice-Chairman of the
Board of the Dutch Association of Defense Counsel.  Professor Wladimiroff is a Member of
the Committee of the Dutch Section of the European Association for the Study of Protection of
Financial Interest of the European Union.  He is also Vice-Chairman of the Board of the
(Dutch) Society of Fiscal Criminal Law.  Professor Wladimiroff has published dozens of articles
on subjects of economic criminal law, fiscal criminal law, environmental criminal law, Euro-
pean Union criminal law and fraud.  He has authored and co-authored several specialist books
on criminal law and procedure.  In 1990, he established the (Dutch) National Course of Advo-
cates for attorneys specializing in criminal defense cases.  Mr. Wladimiroff is also Professor of
Economic Criminal Law and Procedure the Faculty of Law the University of Utrecht.
30. Mr. Orie specializes in international criminal law and Supreme Court cases in criminal
law.  He is leading counsel in several criminal, extradition, and immigration cases the Supreme
Court of the Netherlands.  He has 15 years experience in all aspects of international coopera-
tion in criminal matters, mainly in white collar cases.  Mr. Orie has also worked as a defense
attorney and legal expert in foreign jurisdictions (Germany, Belgium, France, Canada, United
Kingdom).  Mr. Orie founded the Dutch Section of the Association Internationale de Droit
Penal and was Chairman of the Board of this Section (1980-1991).  He has published many arti-
cles in Dutch and foreign professional journals, as well as several textbooks on international
criminal law.
31. See Jan M. Hebly, THE NETHERLANDS CIVIL EVIDENCE ACT OF 1988 (1992).
32. For a description of CEELI, see infra note 1.
33. Their request came through the Coalition for International Justice (CIJ), a tax exempt
501(c)(3) organization created by CEELI to assist the Tribunal.  For a definition of 501(c)(3)
organizations and their tax treatment under federal law, see SELECTED FEDERAL TAXATION
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 445 (Michael D. Rose ed., 1997).
34. The participants were U.S. Attorneys Joseph Jones and Carol Bruce, and British Bar-
rister Steven Kay.
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In an intensive effort to address the intricacies of trial advocacy,
CEELI used mock trials and videotaped direct and cross-
examination exercises to highlight practical techniques that might be
useful during the actual trial.  Yet, qualified as the defense team was,
it was soon apparent that such a short-term exercise, though valuable,
could not provide the training necessary to present an effective de-
fense in an adversarial proceeding.
As a remedy, and in consultation with the defense team, CEELI
approached the ICTY and requested an immediate allocation of
funds to secure the services of an attorney schooled in an adversarial
legal system.35  Despite the ICTY’s ongoing budgetary constraints,
the Registrar agreed to the request.  Subsequent to the Registrar’s
approval, Steven Kay, the English Barrister who participated in the
CEELI training program, arranged a sabbatical from his law practice
and joined the Tadic defense team.36
The importance of the defense team’s new configuration cannot
be overstated.  Even Justice Richard Goldstone, the Chief Prosecutor
for the Tribunal, recognized the effectiveness of this new arrange-
ment.37  The inclusion of Mr. Kay cemented a highly qualified and
competent team that combined experience in both civil and common
law systems.  Immediately, Mr. Kay played a major role in
cross-examining witnesses,38 while Wladimiroff and Orie continued to
direct the overall case and motion arguments.
Numerous measures could be implemented by the Tribunal to
improve the process for assigning counsel.  First, the Tribunal’s Di-
rective should be amended to require attorneys interested in serving
as assigned counsel to prove that they have substantial legal back-
35. The request was made on February 29, 1996, a meeting thincluded Mark S. Ellis, Ex-
ecutive Director of CEELI, Alain Norman, CEELI’s liaison to the Tribunal, and Dorothee de
Sampayo, the Tribunal’s Registrar [hereinafter Sampayo Meeting].
36. Mr. Kay would be paid U.S. $90 per hour, a fee substantially reduced from his normal
rate.
37. “Whether there are convictions or whether there are acquittals will not be the yard-
stick.  The measure is going to be the fairness of the proceedings and without the intervention
of [CEELI], I have no doubt that the first trial before the Tribunal would not have measured
up to the test.”  Richard J. Goldstone, Address Before the Supreme Court of the United States,
1996 CEELI Leadership Award Dinner (October 2, 1996) [hereinafter Goldstone Address].
38. Mr. Kay estimates thhe is handling 95% of witness cross-examinations.  Telephone
Interview with Stephen Kay, Counsel to Mr. Tadic (Sept. 22, 1996) [hereinafter Kay Interview].
For instance, Mr. Kay took the lead in cross-examining several major prosecution witnesses,
including: Nasiha Klipic (June 14th), Mr. Seferovic (June 14th), Sud Hrnic (June 21), Seael
Halvadizic (June 16th), Edin Mrkalj (July 18th), Emid Beganovic (July 19), Mehmed Alic (July
24th), Armin Mujcic (July 26th), Hase Icic (July 30th), and Drajuni Taskic (July 31st).  See id.
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ground in criminal law and in international humanitarian law.  The
combined legal backgrounds of the team of Wladimiroff, Orie, and
Kay should represent the accepted standard.
Second, the Tadic case should be used as a model for putting to-
gether an effective defense team in an international war crimes pro-
ceeding, a team that combines common law and civil law experience.
This first case amply demonstrates the need for expertise in an adver-
sarial proceeding and the injustice of assigning counsel without con-
sidering this need.  Thus, individual attorneys should meet rigorous
criteria for competence in both civil and common law systems or, al-
ternatively, the Registrar should assign two or more attorneys, where
one possesses the requisite common law experience and the team
members’ skills are complementary.
Third, if there is a shortage of interested attorneys qualified in
adversarial proceedings, the Tribunal should require counsel to par-
ticipate in a training program.  The training should provide a solid
foundation in those areas of law in which the defense counsel may be
deficient.  Many jurisdictions provide training programs for new and
current public defenders.39  The ICTY training program might com-
bine trial advocacy skills with an introduction to the Tribunal’s rules
and procedures.40  The only legal assistance currently provided by the
ICTY to assigned counsel is a publication, entitled Manual for Practi-
tioners, designed to assist defense counsel in appearing before the
Court.41  Though helpful, the Manual cannot substitute for trial advo-
cacy experience.
39. In the United States, the Federal Judicial Center conducts regular seminars for federal
public defenders.  The seminars last three to five days and focus on issues such as rules of evi-
dence, case management, oral arguments, opening and closing statements, motions and briefs,
persuasive argumentation, and appeals.  See National Seminar for Federal Defenders, Federal
Judicial Center, Apr. 1-3, 1996 (program of events on file with the Duke Journal of Compara-
tive & International Law); Appellate Writing Workshop for Federal Defenders, Federal Judi-
cial Center, Washington, D.C., May 22-24, 1996 (schedule on file with the Duke Journal of
Comparative & International Law).
40. Under U.S. federal legislation, funds are allocated to provide newly appointed federal
public defenders a three-day training program on the rules and procedures of practicing before
federal courts.
41. The Manual for Practitioners reviews the Tribunal’s procedures and provides informa-
tion on courtroom protocol.  Int’l Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Manual for Prac-
titioners, Version 1.1, (visited Mar. 29, 1997) available in <gopher://gopher.igc.apc.org:7030/00/
manual/manual> (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law). The
Manual is intended to educate practitioners on the specific requirements for appearing before
an international judicial body.  Topics covered include: the facilities the Tribunal, the status of
defense counsel and the relationship between defense counsel and the Court, the relationship
between a client and defense counsel, and procedures before the Court.  See id.
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Finally, it will become increasingly important for the ICTY to
provide training for assigned counsel.  In the future, defense counsel
will likely include attorneys from the former Yugoslavia, particularly
from Serbia, who have neither training from Western universities nor
background in public international law.  The ICTY’s reputation for
fairness could be easily eroded if these attorneys are placed in an un-
familiar legal environment and not given the tools they will need to
function effectively.
In a similar context, training is already being provided to attor-
neys who will potentially participate in the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).42  A program initiated in early 1996 by
Lawyers Without Borders and the European Law Students Associa-
tion (ELSA) included Mr. Wladimiroff and Mr. Orie in an intensive
trial advocacy program.43
III.  LEAD COUNSEL
Under the Directive, the accused is entitled to one attorney as
assigned counsel.44  The word “one” is literal.  Yet it is incomprehen-
sible to think that one attorney can handle the complexities of an in-
ternational war crimes trial.45
In the Tadic case, Mr. Wladimiroff successfully petitioned the
Registrar for an additional defense attorney.  In order to support this
request, however, the Registrar classified Mr. Orie as a “consultant,”
rather than co-counsel.  The Registrar cleverly reasoned that the Di-
rective, while limiting counsel to one attorney, nevertheless allowed
discretionary use of funds to secure the services of a defense counsel
consultant.46  The key issue for the Registrar was thus a financial
one—that is, whether or not the budget would allow the hiring of a
42. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
43. Interview with Mr. Alphons Orie, Co-Counsel for Mr. Tadic (July 16, 1996)
[hereinafter Orie Interview].
44. See Directive, supra note 10, art. 16.
45. During pre-trial hearings, the Registry had calculated that the Tadic case would last
only six weeks. See Orie Interview, supra note 43.  This explains, in part, why the Registry was
not concerned about assigning only one counsel.  The case is now expected to last ten months.
See id.
46. “[C]osts and expenses to be met by the Tribunal shall include costs relating to investi-
gative and procedural steps, measures taken for the production of evidence to assist or support
the defence, as well as expenses for ascertainment of the facts, consultancy and expert opinion
. . . .” Directive, supra note 10, art. 18(B) (emphasis added).
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“consulting attorney.”47  Given the clear and urgent need for addi-
tional counsel, the Registrar deferred judgment on the budget, and
immediately allocated funds for two additional defense attorneys.48
In allocating additional resources to the defense team, the Regis-
trar did not overstep her authority.  Considering the support avail-
able to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP),  the Registrar might even
have been justified in allocating more.  For instance, the Tribunal
created a Special Legal Services division to provide prosecutors with
expertise on criminal and international law.  This office is comprised
of legal experts who not only research and argue pretrial motions, but
also assist each of the trial attorneys in the OTP.49  Nothing compara-
ble exists for defense counsel.
The Tribunal’s Directive should be amended immediately to
permit assignment of co-counsel when necessary.  The number of at-
torneys thus designated should be determined according to, first, the
complexities of the case, and second, budgetary considerations.  It is
difficult to imagine that even the most rudimentary case would not
require at least two full-time defense attorneys.50
IV.  COMPENSATION
The magnitude of an international war crimes trial demands a
rigorous defense with nothing less than assigned counsel’s full-time
commitment of time and resources.  Some will argue that defending
an alleged war criminal could be accomplished through pro bono rep-
resentation.  This notion, however, is naive.  In the Tadic trial, as-
signed counsel has spent 12 to 14 hours a day, six days a week in
pre-trial and trial work.51  Defense counsel has prepared for more
than 85 cross-examinations, and for direct examination of over 35 de-
fense witnesses.52  This type of commitment is all-consuming.  Any-
47. “Where counsel has been assigned, the costs and expenses of legal representation of
the suspect or accused necessarily or reasonably incurred shall be met by the Tribunal subject
to any budgetary constraints.” Id. art. 18(A) (emphasis added).
48. See Sampayo Meeting, supra note 35.
49. See Report, supra note 8, at 15.
50. As this Comment was being researched, there were rumors that the Tribunal would
adopt this recommendation.  Based on the latest amendments to the Directive, the Tribunal
has, in fact, broadened the definition of counsel.  Article 16 of the Amended Directive now
reads: “Under exceptional circumstances and at the request of the person assigned as counsel,
the Registrar may . . . assign a second counsel to assist the lead counsel.  The first assigned shall
be called the lead counsel.”  Amended Directive, supra note 18, art. 16(c).
51. See Kay Interview, supra note 38.
52. See id.
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thing short of an equally committed response from the ICTY to sup-
port the defense team, including fair compensation, is unjust.
Rules covering remuneration of assigned counsel are provided
for in the Tribunal’s Directive.53  Assigned counsel is paid according
to three separate schedules. First, attorneys are paid on a fixed rate
basis.54  The fixed fee is U.S. $400, payable at specific stages of the
trial.55  In the Tadic case, it is envisaged that the fixed rate fee will
pertain to two stages for a total of U.S. $800.56  The second and last
payment will be made after a final detailed statement is submitted by
assigned counsel.57  Since this payment is negligible, it is of little im-
portance to assigned counsel.58
The second type of payment is a daily allowance for living out-
side The Hague.59  This payment is based on the United Nations
Schedule of Daily Subsistence Allowance Rates,60 and is paid on a
progressive rate reduction schedule.61  Since the assigned counsel for
Tadic is a local attorney, he does not receive the daily allowance.
The third type of payment, and the most important, is the daily
fee.62  The daily fee is fixed to the number of days worked and, for as-
signed counsel, is limited to U.S. $200 a day.63  When calculated on
the basis of a 7 ½  hour workday, Mr. Wladimiroff is paid U.S. $26
per hour.  Besides covering assigned counsel’s salary, this amount is
also meant to cover general administrative costs for the counsel’s of-
fice.
This absurdly low fee compelled Mr. Wladimiroff to petition the
Registry for an increase in his daily fee.64  In what would be an ex-
tremely important decision by the Registrar to assist the defense
counsel, an informal agreement was negotiated, increasing Mr.
Wladimiroff’s daily fee from U.S. $200 to $825 a day (U.S. $110 per
hour).65  The two “lawyer consultants” were to be paid U.S. $80 and
53. See Directive, supra note 10, art. 23.
54. See id. art 23 (A)(I).
55. See id. art. 24.
56. See Orie Interview, supra note 43.
57. See Directive, supra note 10, art. 28(B).
58. See Orie Interview, supra note 43.
59. See Directive, supra note 10, art. 23 (A)(iii).
60. See id.
61. See id. art.26.
62. See id. art. 23 (A)(ii).
63. See id. art. 25.
64. See Orie Interview, supra note 43.
65. See id.
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$90 per hour respectively.66  This new rate is a significant improve-
ment and, for the lead counsel, is actually equal to the fee paid to the
lead prosecutor.67
However, the current fee structure for assigned counsel—even
with the increase—is still inadequate to cover administrative costs.68
Nor does the current fee level for lead counsel equal Mr. Wladimi-
roff’s opportunity cost for agreeing to forego his regular clientele in
order to represent Dusko Tadic.69  Even in the Nuremberg and Tokyo
trials, the Court provided defense counsel with a fee roughly equiva-
lent to their regular salaries.70  The defense attorneys in these trials
also received certain perquisites necessary to undertake their cases.71
In contrast, the Registrar of the ICTY has informed the defense team
that they will not be remunerated for preparatory work done in Bos-
nia-Herzegovina.72  In addition to trying to control overhead costs in-
curred by the defense, the ICTY is contemplating a limit on the total
number of hours worked by each defense attorney to 175 hours per
month.73
Further attempts to limit compensation for defense counsel
could have a devastating impact on their livelihoods.  As it now
stands, assigned counsel is prohibited from receiving remuneration
from any other source.74  Consequently, Mr. Wladimiroff depends
solely on remuneration from the ICTY so long as he represents Ta-
dic.  The ICTY should not encourage further erosion of counsel’s
fees; on the contrary, it should actively promote an equitable fee
schedule that provides fair compensation for assigned defense coun-
sel.
The long-term impact of low compensation could have a demor-
alizing effect on future candidates for defense counsel.75  Mr. Wladi-
66. Mr. Orie, a partner in Mr. Wladimiroff’s firm, would be paid U.S. $80 per hour, and
Mr. Steven Kay, the British Barrister added to the defense team, would receive U.S. $90 per
hour.  See id.
67. The fee paid to the lead prosecutor is U.S. $110.  See Norman Interview, supra note 26.
68. See Orie Interview, supra note 43.
69. Mr. Wladimiroff’s normal fees are U.S. $300 per hour.  See id.
70. A successful German lawyer earned at that time between U.S. $7500 and $10,000 a
year ($625 to $833 per month).  The Court provided assigned defense counsel with a one-time
payment of $1,000, and a monthly payment of $625.  See CONOT, supra note 2, at 83.
71. See id. at 94.
72. See Kay Interview, supra note 38.
73. See id.
74. See Directive, supra note 10, art. 23(B).
75. See Orie Interview, supra note 43.
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miroff and Mr. Orie already have cautioned other attorneys from un-
dertaking an assignment unless there is some improvement in the fee
schedule.76  Furthermore, both attorneys have indicated that the low
pay may prevent them from representing Mr. Tadic on appeal, if an
appeal is necessary.77
To correct inequities in the remuneration of assigned counsel
and the OTP, the Directive should be amended to at least provide the
lead defense counsel with the equivalent of what a lead prosecutor is
paid, based on the U.N. pay scale.78  In addition, the daily fee sched-
ule for assigned counsel should include a formula to cover general of-
fice and administrative costs.79  In changing its compensation policy,
the ICTY would simply reflect an accepted practice in Western coun-
tries that salaries for assigned defense counsel should be at least
comparable to prosecutors’ salaries.  For instance, in the United
States an important factor in setting the rate of compensation paid to
public defenders is the rate paid to U.S. state attorneys.80  In an effort
to prevent inequities, some jurisdictions legislate a minimum salary
range for public defenders that is proportionate to prosecutors’ sala-
ries.81  In other jurisdictions, the salaries of public defenders and
prosecutors are roughly equivalent.82
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. In discussions with the Registrar, the author was informed that the U.N. pay scale for a
prosecutor stipulates a base salary of U.S. $57,000, plus an adjustment of $34,000, totaling
$91,500.  The Tribunal also pays, for each prosecutorial position, taxes and administrative costs
in the amount of $55,000.  Thus, if the Tribunal were to compensate assigned counsel at an
equivalent level, the total cost for defense counsel would be $146,500.  See Sampayo Meeting,
supra note 35.  Discussions about amending the Directive took place shortly after this Com-
ment was written; by the time it went to press, the Directive had, in fact, been officially
amended.  “The fixed daily rate for fees . . . shall be assessed by the Registrar on the basis of
the seniority and experience of counsel . . . .”  Amended Directive, supra note 18, art. 25.  The
hourly fees are based on the following scale: lead counsel, $110 for 20 years or more experi-
ence; $100 for 15-19 years of experience; $90 for 10-14 years of experience; and $80 for 5-9
years of experience.  Co-counsel is paid an hourly fee of $80.  See id. at Annex VI.
79. Under the Amended Directive, the new fee structure includes “general office costs.”
See Amended Directive, supra note 18, art. 25.
80. See Guidelines for the Administration of the Criminal Justice Act, 7 GUIDE TO JU-
DICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES § 4.02(A)(3).
81. In the State of Illinois, state law sets a salary range for public defenders that is based
on the salary of the elected state’s attorney in each jurisdiction.  For instance, in one category,
the public defender cannot make less than 40% of the state’s attorney’s salary.  See Trends and
Issues 90: Criminal and Juvenile Justice in Illinois, Illinois Crim. Justice Information Auth.
(visited March 27, 1997) available at http://www_loc.eecs.ulc.edu:80/~suvavna/CRJ/INTRO/TI
(on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law).
82. In a recent study conducted by the U.S. National Legal Aid and Defender Association,
it was noted that 47% of state public defenders responding to a survey indicated that their sala-
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V. EQUALITY OF ARMS
The pretrial proceedings have shown a serious inequality of arms
in that all the Prosecution’s witnesses are outside the Srpske Republic,
and that all authorities except those of the Srpske Republic have fully
co-operated with  the Prosecution in this case.83
Since his opening statement in the Tadic trial, Mr. Wladimiroff
has argued vehemently that basic tenets of a fair trial remain absent.84
Attorneys for Mr. Tadic have consistently held that an inequality of
arms85 in this case has “seriously handicapped” preparation of the de-
fense.86  At issue has been the continued lack of access to key sites in
the Prijedor region of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Local Serb authorities, in
a bid to challenge the Tribunal’s legitimacy, have persistently tried to
stymie and derail the defense case.87  This situation is unacceptable.
If not resolved, attorneys in future cases will face the same obstacles,
and the ICTY ultimately might suffer from a perceived inability to
guarantee a proper defense to persons accused of war crimes.  Since
the majority of current indictments are against individuals alleged to
have committed war crimes in the region now controlled by Repub-
lika Srpska,88 mounting an adequate defense in each case will hinge
upon counsel’s ability to secure evidence and witness testimony from
within this hostile and uncooperative environment.
It was not until January 1996 (only four months before the trial
began) that fighting subsided enough for the Tadic defense team to
even enter relevant locations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.89  Even then,
they were severely constrained in their ability to move throughout
the area.  The OTP indeed faced the same limitations; yet, because
their witnesses had moved outside of affected areas, it did not ham-
                                                                                                                                     
ries were equivalent to the salaries of state prosecutors.  Of those respondents who indicated a
disparity in salary, the difference was approximately $1502 for entry level positions.  See Alvita
S. Eason & Billie Bitely, Just Compensation? A Preliminary Report of the NLADA Salary Sur-
vey of Defender Systems, at 6 (Dec. 4, 1994).
83. Opening Remarks, supra note 1, at 42.
84. See id. at 36.
85. See Orie Interview, supra note 43.
86. See Opening Remarks, supra note 1, at 36.
87. See id. at 36-48.
88. Of the 74 ICTY indictees, 44 are alleged to have committed crimes in Republika
Srpska, primarily at various detention camps.  These include the Omarska Camp (19); Suska
Camp (1); Keratern Camp (13); Bosanski Samac (6); Srebrenica (2); Stupni Do (1) and Brcko
(2).  See BULL. OF THE INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, No. 8, July 19,
1996, at 3.
89. See Opening Remarks, supra note 1, at 36.
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per their investigation to the same extent.90  The prosecution also
could rely on its official status as an arm of the ICTY to gain coop-
eration from national authorities; the same was not true for the de-
fense.91  While the Tribunal’s Statute provides the legal instruments
with which to force cooperation in the OTP’s pretrial investigation,92
“[t]he defense,” as Mr. Wladimiroff noted, “has no power whatsoever
to enlist anyone’s cooperation in providing relevant facts.  The de-
fense’s activities preceding the trial depends solely upon the volun-
tary cooperation of others . . . . Everything, therefore, that the De-
fense has been able to achieve so far is the result of [the Defense’s]
own negotiations with authorities and individuals and not of any pro-
vision of the Tribunal.”93
Even where access is granted, however, formidable challenges
remain. People living in the area are still afraid to speak and are of-
ten threatened if they do.94  Furthermore, “[w]itnesses in the area
who held any police or military authority have been barred from
talking to the Defence.”95  In a recent incident, the defense counsel
interviewed a potential witness in a small town in Republika Srpska
at approximately 6:00 p.m.  The next morning, by the time counsel
arrived for an unrelated visit to the police station, the witness had
been contacted by the Chief of Police and was sitting in police head-
quarters.96  During a recent interview for Court TV, defense attorneys
expressed frustration over the fact that Prijedor’s local police chief
refused an exit visa to a defense witness wanting to testify in the
Hague.97  Two other witnesses who had agreed to testify for the de-
fense backed out at the last minute because of threats to their lives.98
The rigid “don’t cooperate, don’t speak” policy carried out by
local police demonstrates just who wields power in the municipalities
of Republika Srpska.  One local police officer commented, “No one
can order me to allow witnesses for the Defence to be investigated in
90. See id.
91. See id. at 37.
92. “States shall cooperate with the International Tribunal in the investigation and prose-
cution of persons accused of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law.”
Statute, supra note 4, art. 29(1).
93. See Opening Remarks, supra note 1, at 42.
94. See Orie Interview, supra note 43.
95. Opening Remarks, supra note 1, at 45.
96. See Kay Interview, supra note 38.
97. Court TV (television broadcast, Sept. 17, 1996).
98. See id.
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my area.”99  Mr. Wladimiroff, in his opening statement before the
Tribunal, framed the problem thus:
In preparing the defence, we have struggled with the hostility and
suspicion with which the Tribunal is viewed in the Serb Republic
and, in particular, in the Prijedor area.  Those in power in this area
have blocked avenues of investigation . . . . It might be thought that
they would be eager to help Dusko Tadic in his defense at this trial
and treat him as one of their own.  This, your Honours, has not
been the case.  The Defence of Dusko Tadic has been prepared
with little or no help from the Prijedor authorities, and there have
been active attempts to prevent us from obtaining evidence on be-
half of our client to prove his innocence.100
The Tribunal should take action to ensure the defense’s ability
to secure witnesses for trial.  Given the difficulties involved in secur-
ing cooperation from potential witnesses in Republika Srpska, and
because the ICTY does not have a police force to compel witnesses
to testify, available defense witnesses should be provided safe con-
duct.  Orders for safe conduct should grant witnesses limited immu-
nity from prosecution when appearing in the Hague to give testi-
mony.101  Although orders for safe conduct are not specifically
provided for in the Statute or the Rules, the Trial Chamber could
find authority in Rule 54, which reads “At the request of either party
or proprio motu, a Judge or a Trial Chamber may issue such orders,
summonses, subpoenas, warrants and transfer orders as may be nec-
essary for the purposes of an investigation or the preparation or con-
duct of the trial.”102
If safe conduct is not feasible, the Trial Chamber should liberally
permit defense witnesses to give testimony by means of video link.
Just recently, the Trial Chamber ruled that defense witnesses can of-
fer testimony via video conferencing if they cannot or will not travel
to the Hague.103  The video link could be a live television link between
the Trial Chamber and a safe harbor, such as an embassy, in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  To mitigate the very real threat of reprisals against
99. Opening Remarks, supra note 1, at 45.
100. Id.
101. See European Convention and Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (83)12 of the
Committee of Ministers Concerning Safe Conduct for Witnesses in Application of Article 12 of
the European Convention (Sept. 23, 1983).
102. Rules, supra note 13, Rule 54.
103. Decision on the Defense Motion to Summon and Protect Defense Witnesses and on
the Giving of Evidence By Video-Link, Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T (June 25, 1996).
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witnesses who testify, the Trial Chamber should refrain from dis-
closing witnesses’ identity to the public.  This elementary form of
witness protection is supported by the Statute104 and the Rules,105 each
of which contains a provision to guarantee confidentiality.
VI.  CONCLUSION
There is no question that history will judge the Tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda on the fairness or unfairness of their
proceedings.  Whether there are convictions or whether there are ac-
quittals will not be the yardstick.  The measure is going to be the fair-
ness of the proceedings.106
The historic importance of this first trial before the ICTY should
not be underestimated.  Not since Nuremberg and Tokyo has the in-
ternational community attempted to bring to justice individuals
charged with war crimes.  If this painstaking experiment in interna-
tional humanitarian law succeeds, the Tribunal will ensure that indi-
viduals responsible for atrocities, having been fairly tried and con-
victed, are held accountable for their actions.  The Tribunal cannot
reverse the tragedy that took place in Bosnia.  It can, however, be a
voice for those who no longer speak, and it can help to restore faith
in the lawful pursuit of justice.
The Tribunal might also be the precursor to a permanent inter-
national criminal court.  Movement in this direction, however, de-
pends upon the integrity of the institution and its general acceptance
by participating states.  Success in the pending trials will thus rest
upon the fairness of the Tribunal’s proceedings.  If the proceedings
are considered biased against defendants, the loss will be to the Tri-
bunal’s legitimacy.
104. See Statute, supra note 4, art. 20(4) (“The hearings shall be public unless the Trial
Chamber decides to close the proceedings in accordance with its rules of procedure and evi-
dence.”); see also id. art. 22 (“The International Tribunal shall provide in its rules of procedure
and evidence for the protection of victims and witnesses. Such protection measures shall in-
clude, but shall not be limited to, the conduct of in camera proceedings and the protection of
the victim’s identity.”).
105. See Rules, supra note 13, Rule 69(A) (“In exceptional circumstances, the Prosecutor
may apply to a Trial Chamber to order the non-disclosure of the identity of a victim or witness
who may be in danger or at risk until such person is brought under the protection of the Tribu-
nal.”); see also id. Rule 79 (“The Trial Chamber may order that the press and public be ex-
cluded from all or part of the proceedings for reasons of: . . . (ii) safety, security or non-
disclosure of the identity of a victim or witness . . . .”).
106. Goldstone Address, supra note 37.
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The Tadic case is a window into procedural challenges uniquely
presented by a war crimes trial.  Because it is the first proceeding
held before the Tribunal, it also offers a rare opportunity to assess
and shape standard practice in a relatively new area of law.  This
Comment, by focusing on low attorney compensation, inequality of
arms, and the unrealistic expectations now placed upon a single at-
torney, highlights some of the problems incumbent on the defense in
a war crimes trial.  Amendments to the Tribunal’s internal regula-
tions to remedy these deficiencies can ease the undue burden on as-
signed counsel.  More importantly, they will enhance the Tribunal’s
credibility and set the yardstick by which future trials are measured.
